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The Supreme Court has declared that the Sherman Act,' "as a charter
of freedom, . . has a generality and adaptability comparable to that
found to be desirable in constitutional provisions." 2 It has announced that
voluntary action to end abuses and to foster fair competitive opportunities
may be undertaken by industry and "the fact that the correction of abuses
may tend to stabilize a business, or to produce fairer price levels, does not
mean that the abuses should go uncorrected or that cooperative endeavor to
correct them necessarily constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade." 3
It is pertinent to examine the decision of the court in The Sugar Institute,
Inc. v. United States,4 to see whether, when these principles are applied to a
concrete set of facts, a definite and practical result is obtained.,
The Sugar Institute suit was brought by the United States to dissolve
the Institute and to restrain the sugar refining companies which composed it,
* Revision of address before Trade Association Executives in New York City on April
7, x936.
t A. B., i9o5, LL. B., 1907, Columbia University; Assistant Attorney General of the
United States, 1924-25; Assistant to Attorney General, 1925-29; counsel to commission for
revision of New York State public service commission laws, 1929.
1. 26 STAT. 209 (I890), 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1927).
2. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 359 (1933).
3. Id. at 374.
4. 56 Sup. Ct. 629 (x936). For a previous history of the case see Handler, The Sugar
Institute Case and the Present Stabu of the Anti-Trust Laws (1936) 36 CoL L. Rxv. i.
5. The first case to reach the Supreme Court under the Sherman Act also concerned the
sugar industry. The case, United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. I (1895), held that
the Sherman Act was powerless to reach a combination which monopolized the sugar refining
business within the State of Pennsylvania. Although the combination had a substantial con-
trol of the refining business in the United States, the Court found that it did not directly re-
strain interstate commerce. For a time it was believed that the decision had destroyed the
effectiveness of the Sherman Act, bt subsequent cases have so restricted the holding that
the Knight case is no longer a substantial obstacle to the enforcement of the anti-trust laws.
The Sugar Institute case is in marked contrast to the narrowly legalistic interpretation
which the Supreme Court adopted in its opinion in the Knight case.
(929)
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and the individual defendants, from engaging in an illegal conspiracy in
restraint of interstate and foreign commerce in violation of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act. The district court refused to dissolve the Institute.6  It
held, however, that the combination unreasonably restrained interstate and
foreign commerce in sugar. A decree was entered which permanently en-
joined the defendants from engaging in 45 stated activities. The Supreme
Court modified and affirmed this decree.
But the meaning of the decision in the Sugar Institute case cannot
properly be understood by a mere recital of the provisions of the final decree.
The restrictions which the Act imposes "are not mechanical or artificial." '
The conclusions of the Court depend upon "a close and objective scrutiny of
particular conditions and purposes . . . in each case." s The inhibitions
of the decree are predicated on a factual background which colors and
explains the decision itself.9 The condemnation of a particular practice
under the peculiar facts before the Court cannot be taken as a final deter-
mination that all similar practices are illegal in all cases and under all cir-
cumstances.
THE FACTS
The facts presented to the Supreme Court were in dispute. The conten-
tions of the government were upheld as to the facts and for purposes of this
analysis must be accepted. These facts and the inferences drawn from them
by the Court may be summarized as follows:
The Sugar Institute was organized in 1927. Prior to its formation the
fifteen defendant sugar companies refined more than 8o per cent of all sugar
consumed within the United States. The Court found that subsequent to
1927 these companies refined between 7o and 8o per cent of all the sugar
consumed within the United States. The formation of the Institute did not
therefore result in increasing the relative size of these companies. But
obviously insofar as these companies acted concertedly their power was in-
creased. It was the combined size and power of the members of the Institute
which the Court considered in determining the extent of the restraint imposed
and as showing the public concern in the problem presented.
The Court emphasized the fact that sugar has become a standardized
commodity. It was pointed out in the argument and briefs of counsel that
the prices of such standardized commodities must necessarily approach uni-
formity. While the Court apparently recognized uniformity of price as an
economic consequence of uniformity of product, it significantly observed:
6. United States v. Sugar Institute, Inc., 2 C. C. H. Fed. Trade Reg. Serv. 7124, 7236
(S. D. N. Y. 1934).
7. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 360 (1933).
8. Ibid.
9. This background was presented to the lower court in over 900 exhibits and ioooo
pages of testimony.
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"The fact that, because sugar is a standardized commodity, there is a strong
tendency to uniformity of price, makes it the more important that such oppor-
tunities as may exist for fair competition should not be impaired." 10
Prior to the formation of the Sugar Institute numerous unfair and
uneconomic competitive practices had grown up. Many of the refiners had
been accustomed to announce their prices to the trade just as is done in many
other large industries. In many instances, however, refiners had departed
from the openly published prices and had given secret prices and rebates to
favored customers. As a result, the actual price structure of the industry
was unknown to competitors. Neither buyers nor sellers were able to deter-
mine what prices were being paid or obtained by their competitors. Most of
these secret concessions and rebates were favorable to the large purchasers.
The actual prices charged varied with the extent of pressure which the buyers
could exert and the degree of the deception to which they and the refiners
were willing to resort. There is no doubt that this condition resulted in
serious financial loss both to the refiners and to the buyers of sugar.
In view of these facts, the defendants urged that the primary purpose
of the Institute and its members was to abolish secret concessions, to elimi-
nate wasteful production, and to supply accurate trade statistics. This con-
tention was rejected. The Court held that the activities of the Institute and
its members went beyond what was necessary to accomplish these avowed
purposes and that the restraint imposed by the agreement of the Institute and
its members was unreasonable.
THE PRACTICES CONDEMNED
(a) Much of the opinion is devoted to a consideration of the so-called
"basic agreement." The "basic agreement" was this: The defendant agreed
to sell sugar only upon prices, terms and conditions publicly announced in
advance of sale, and to adhere, without deviation, to such prices, terms and
conditions until changes were also publicly announced. This, of course, does
not mean that there was a general agreement as to a price to be charged by
all members of the Institute. It means merely that each member of the Insti-
tute was free to set his own price, but that once the price was determined
by each there was an agreement which obligated each refiner not to deviate
from that price until he posted a new price. It was this agreement not to
sell except at the posted price which the Court, in the light of all the facts,
found objectionable. And the decree enjoins "the carrying out of the open
price plan so far as it seeks to compel . . . an adherence to prices, terms,
etc. announced in advance [of sale] ." 11
The emphasis placed by the Court upon the "basic agreement" does not
mean that in the absence of circumstances indicative of an unlawful intent
io. 56 Sup. Ct. at 643.
xi. 56 Sup. Ct. at 644.
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an "open price plan" is necessarily illegal. If the only obligation imposed by
the Sugar Institute had been the requirement that members publicly post
prices to be charged to particular classes of customers in particular localities,
it would have been difficult to find any substantial restraint of trade because
the only compulsion imposed upon members would have been the obligation
to give publicity to prices. The objectionable requirement here, if any of the
open price provisions were in themselves objectionable, was that members
should sell only upon prices announced in advance of sale.
The defendants urged that the agreement required the seller merely to
give publicity to prices coincident with the sale. The Court did not comment
upon this argument, but in enjoining the "basic agreement" it was careful to
indicate that its condemnation extended to the scheme as a whole and not to
any particular practice considered as an isolated act. The Court definitely
stated that it was because of the range and effect of the limitation upon free-
dom of action imposed by the "basic agreement" and the resultant inability
to make "special arrangements" that not only the agreement but the course
of action under it were considered unreasonable restraints of trade. And the
inhibitions of the decree extend only to "adherence to prices . . an-
nounced in advance of sale." 12
The insistence of the Court that the refiners should be free "to make
special arrangements" is somewhat puzzling. By "special arrangements" the
Court must have meant sales which departed from the prices or terms pre-
viously announced. It does not follow, however, that the insistence upon
"special arrangements" is to be taken either as an approval of a secret
arrangement or as a condemnation of an agreement to give publicity to prices
coincident with the sale. The provisions of the Clayton Act prohibiting price
discriminations 13 dearly support the view that "special arrangements" has
no reference to secret arrangements or to any practice intended to promote
discriminations.1 4
1z Ibid. Italics added.
13. "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly to discriminate in price between different purchasers
of commodities, which commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other
place under the jurisdiction of the United States, where the effect of such discrimination may
be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price between pur-
chasers of commodities on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the
commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for difference in the cost of selling or
transportation, or discrimination in price in the same or different communities made in good
faith to meet competition: And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall pre-
vent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting
their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade." Clayton Act, § 2,
38 STAT. 73O (914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1927).
14. It is true that the Clayton Act prohibits price discrimination only where the effect
is substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
But the Congressional debates make it clear that discriminatory price-cutting was regarded as
an evil in itself by many members of Congress. It was looked upon as a species of unfair
competition, regardless of who practiced it. The first drafts of the Act outlawed discrimina-
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The following observation of the Court significantly points out that the
"basic agreement" could not be divorced from an illegal scheme, and for that
reason, if for no other, it was enjoined:
"The 'basic agreement' cannot be divorced from the steps taken to
make it effective, and the requirements of the Institute must be viewed
in the light of the particular opportunities which they cut off or cur-
tailed. The crucial question-whether, in the ostensible effort to pre-
vent unfair competition, the resources of fair competition have been
impaired-is presented not abstractly but in connection with various
concrete restrictions to which the decree below was addressed." 15
What were these "concrete restrictions" which the Court emphasized in
holding the combination illegal?
(b) The members of the Institute agreed that no quantity discounts
should be granted to any purchaser. It was found as a fact that what was
prohibited by the agreement was not only "unsystematic and secret quantity
discounts" 16 but also discounts "systematically graded according to quan-
tity." 17 In condemning this practice, the Court pointed out that the sale of
sugar in quantities often effected substantial economies and that the agree-
ment precluded the seller from passing these savings on to the purchaser. A
decree was approved which enjoined the defendants by concert of action from
"preventing, restraining or refusing to grant quantity or other discounts
where such discounts reflect, effect, or result in economies to refiners either
in direct or indirect cost." I
This, of course, does not mean that a single manufacturer must differ-
entiate in price between a purchaser buying a small quantity and a purchaser
buying a large quantity of a given commodity. But it does mean that com-
petitors dominating an industry may not agree to eliminate all differences
in price based on quantities purchased, particularly where sales in quantity
can be made at a saving in cost.
Section 2 of the Clayton Act condemns price discriminations but it
specifically excepts from its condemnation discounts based on differences in
quantities.'9 In 1914, when Section 2 of the Clayton Act was before Con-
gress, there was some thought that discounts in any form should be pro-
hibited by statute. It was said in debate that such discrimination gave special
tion where combined with an intent to injure and regardless of any tendency to create
a monopoly. The change later introduced may perhaps be attributed to a change from a penal
to a regulatory type of statute, in the course of which the test of intent gave way to a sup-
posedly more objective standard. See 5I CoNG. REc. 9159, g26o, 1579o, I5819, 15934, 16043,
i6o57, 16115, 16145, 16i5q, 16267 (1914). But see id. at 9265.
iS. 56 Sup. Ct. at 637.
i6. Id. at 64o.
17. Ibid.
IS. Ibid.
ig. See note 13 supra.
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advantage to the large buyer.20 An arbitrary condemnation of quantity dis-
counts was excluded from the Clayton Act because it was regarded as
Utopian,2 1 and because the main evil with which the legislators were con-
cerned was local price-cutting, which had become a political storm-center
during the rise of Standard Oil.
The fact that the Court now blocks an attempt to eliminate quantity
discounts by voluntary agreement suggests that discriminations in price based
on the quantity sold are not necessarily the indicia of monopoly. As late as
1914, price discriminations of all kinds were regarded mainly as weapons
of aggression employed by growing large-scale combinations against their
weaker competitors. Apparently the Court now feels that agreements to
eliminate quantity discounts may deprive the buyer of savings in cost of
manufacture to which he is justly entitled. Since in general the large buyers
will be entitled to such discounts it is apparent that the Court will not permit
industry by agreement to penalize the large buyer by denying him the benefit
of lower manufacturing costs. The result is that the small buyer will prob-
ably continue to conduct his business at a competitive disadvantage.
22
(c) The members of the Institute had agreed to make no coritracts per-
mitting the buyer to take delivery of sugar more than 30 days after date.
The Court found that in the sugar industry long term contracts had "a real
economic value to refiner and to consumer" and held that the agreement to
eliminate such contracts unreasonably restrained trade. With respect to
such contracts there is nothing in the opinion which prevents any manufac-
turer from adopting any policy which he chooses to follow, but concert of
action which imposes arbitrary and onerous conditions on any class of pur-
chaser and which "would tend to prevent many entirely fair contracts" is
prohibited.
(d) The Court found that the refiners had an agreement under which
they refused to deal with any broker, warehouseman or customer who acted
both as a broker and as a warehouseman. To enforce this agreement each
refiner submitted lists of its brokers and warehousemen. These lists were
circulated among the refiners, and brokers who acted both as brokers and
warehousemen were dropped from the list. The commissions to be paid
warehousemen and brokers were also set by agreement. It was found that
this practice was carried out in a harsh and arbitrary manner without regard
to the effect upon the brokers.
20. 51 CONG. REC. 9o72, 9168, 9263, 9590, 14250 (1914).
21. Id. at 9o72.
22. It is now clear, however, that small purchasers may obtain the benefit of large-scale
buying by the use of purchasing agencies. In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288
U. S. 344 (1932) the Court upheld the legality of an exclusive selling agency formed by 137
producers of soft coal. This combination was upheld although the agency represented about
73 per cent of the commercial production in the immediate producing region. It did not, how-
ever, dominate or control any substantial market.
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The Court, without qualification, condemned this practice when carried
out as the result of an agreement among competitors dominating and con-
trolling an industry. The Court considered it reasonably certain that ade-
quate protection against illicit practices could have been secured by means far
less drastic. Here again the decision does not mean that a particular manu-
facturer acting alone is prevented from selecting his own customers or even
from refusing to deal. It does not mean that an individual manufacturer
may not impose reasonable restrictions upon any purchaser.23  But it does
mean that this result may not be accomplished by an agreement between
competitors, where the dominant motive is "to preserve the uniformity of
price structure." 24
In condemning the agreements eliminating quantity discounts and long-
term contracts and the agreements affecting brokers and warehousemen, the
Court did not make new law. It merely reaffirmed and applied a principle
of law that has long been settled. The members of the Sugar Institute
refined and sold 8o per cent of all sugar sold in the United States. It there-
fore seems apparent that these refiners had the power to impose upon buyers
and dealers such conditions as the refiners agreed upon. The effect of the
agreement not to deal with brokers or warehousemen who acted as both was
therefore to prevent all brokers and warehousemen from engaging in busi-
ness except upon the conditions agreed upon and imposed by the refiners.
The agreement to eliminate quantity discounts and long term contracts simi-
larly imposed arbitrary and onerous conditions upon all buyers of sugar. No
doctrine is more firmly established under the Sherman Act than that competi-
tors by agreement may not impose conditions upon those with whom they
deal, where, as in the Sugar Institute case, those conditions substantially in-
jure such third parties. As early as 1907 in Loewe v. Lawlor.,25 the Supreme
23. In Federal Trade Comm. v. Raymond Bros., 263 U. S. 565, 573 (1924) the Supreme
Court observed: "It is the right, 'long recognized', of a trader engaged in an entirely private
business, 'freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal'. Thus a retail dealer 'has the unquestioned right to stop dealing with a wholesaler for
reasons sufficient to himself'. He may lawfully make a fixed rule of conduct not to buy from
a producer or manufacturer who sells to consumers in competition with himself. . . . Or
he may stop dealing with a wholesaler who he thinks is acting unfairly in trying to under-
mine his trade. . . . Likewise a wholesale dealer has the right to stop dealing with a man-
ufacturer 'for reasons sufficient to himself'. And he may do so because he thinks such manu-
facturer is undermining his trade by selling either to a competing wholesaler or to a retailer
competing with his own customers. Such other wholesaler or retailer has the reciprocal
right to stop dealing with the manufacturer. This each may do, in the exercise of free com-
petition, leaving it to the manufacturer to determine which customer, in the exercise of his
own judgment, he desires to retain.
"A different case would of course be presented if the Raymond Company had combined
and agreed with other wholesale dealers that none would trade with any manufacturer who
sold to other wholesale dealers competing with themselves, or to retail dealers competing with
their customers. An act lawful when done by one may become wrongful when done by many
acting in concert, taking on the form of a conspiracy which may be prohibited if the result
be hurtful to the public or to the individual against whom the concerted action is di-
rected.
24. Ibid.
25. 208 U. S. 274, 293 (Io8). See also Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U. S.
433, 440 (zgio) ; Eastern State Lumber Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 6oo (1914) ; Ander-
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Court expressly pointed out that the Sherman Act "prohibits any combination
whatever which essentially . . . restricts . . the liberty of a trader to
engage in business," 26 or a combination "aimed at compelling third parties
and strangers involuntarily not to engage in the course of trade except on
conditions that the combination imposes.. ,, 27
The lower court made a definite and specific provision in its decree
enjoining any agreement to sell on delivered prices or on any system of
delivered prices including zone prices, or to refuse to sell f. o. b. refinery. In
the Supreme Court the defendants waived their assignments of error as to
this provision as well as to certain other provisions affecting various aspects
of transportation. 28  No argument on these questions having been made, the
son v. Shipowners' Ass'n, 272 U. S. 359 (1926) ; United States v. American Linseed Oil Co.,
262 U. S. 371, 390 (1923) ; Montague v. Lowrey, 193 U. S. 38, 47 (19o4) ; Binderup v. Pathe
Exchange, Inc., 263 U. S. 291 (1923).
26. 208 U. S. at 293.
27. Id. at 295.
28. In the present session of Congress bills have been introduced to amend the anti-trust
laws to prohibit the use of delivered prices and the refusal to sell f. o. b. point of origin,whether (a) by agreement among competitors or (b) by the individual act of one person.
The so-called Anti-Basing Point Act was introduced on February 20, 1936, by Repre-
sentative Utterback as H. R. 11329 and by Senator Wheeler as S. 4055. The bill would pro-hibit the following: (Sec. 27) the addition to the shipping point price of a charge for deliv-
ery other than the actual cost of delivery through such agency as the purchaser may elect tospecify; (Sec. 28) agreements to maintain any system of quoting a price which includes anyamount as transportation charge which is not actually defrayed by the seller; (See. 29) the
quotation of a delivered price without stating the amount thereof which represents cost oftransportation and without giving the buyer the option of deducting this amount and paying
the difference as an f. o. b. point of origin price.
The Robinson Bill, S. 3154 (originally called the Anti-Chain Store Bill), would achievemuch the same result by eliminating from Section 2 of the Clayton Act the provision whichnow permits different prices in the same or different communities made in good faith to meetcompetition. It is under this provision that delivered prices are usually justified. In the report
of the Senate Judiciary Committee on this Bill, Senator Logan says: "The weakness ofpresent Section 2 (of the Clayton Act) lies principally in the fact that: (2) it permits dis-criminations to meet competition." That this was the fundamental purpose of the RobinsonBill is clear from the debate on April 28, 1936, in which Senator Logan said: "Then there
was another provision in the Clayton Act which was fatal, namely, that price discriminationmight be made in order to meet competition. That is where the chief defect in the Clayton
Act is to be found."
The origin of this notion about the chief defect of the Clayton Act is to be found in Dr.Fetter's book, THE MASQUERADE OF MOOP014Y (1931, in which he said (at 315):
. . . excusing, in any class of cases, local discrimination under the mistaken belief that itis
a necessity to competition 'in good faith' is but preserving in bad faith and in all cases the evilpowers of monopoly." Dr. Fetter has finally convinced the Federal Trade Commission and,
through it, certain leaders in Congress that the weaknesses of the law and the errors of thecourts must be corrected by legislation which would remove the privilege to deviate in pricefor the purpose of meeting competition, which would forbid ,freight absorption, whether byagreement or not, and which would require f. o. b. origin prices. On his dismay at the errorsof the courts, see his discussion of the case of Fairmont Creamery Co. v. State of Minnesota,
274 U. S. i (r927), (THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY at 318 et seq.). In this case the UnitedStates Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Minnesota statute forbidding a different price
to one customer than to another, irrespective of motive.
The Robinson Bill was passed by the Senate on April 30, 1936, but not until SenatorMcNary had included an amendment which would preserve the right to deviate in price inthe same or different communities in good faith to meet competition. At this writing the
companion bill, H. R. 8442, known as the Patman Bill, is awaiting a rule from the Rules
Committee which would permit it to come to debate in the House. Should the Patman Billbe passed by the House it would then go to a conference committee with the Robinson Bill.If a compromise bill should be enacted into law, it would be particularly significant to note
whether (1) it includes the McNary amendment and (2) it has the effect of requiring the
exclusive use of f. o. b. origin prices.
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Court accepted the findings below that the defendants' action went further
than was necessary to prevent secret rebating and amounted to an illegal
restraint of trade, and said that it found "no reason for disturbing the find-
ings on these subjects." 29 The same rule which the Court applied to the
agreements to eliminate quantity discounts, etc., would seem to condemn
these practices as to which the defendants waived their assignments of error.
Emphasizing the elements which have been pointed out above and
considering them all as part of a unified plan, the Court stated that "there
is no room for doubt as to the nature and effect of the restrictions", 30 and
held the combination illegal. But there were specific practices which the
Court approved.
STATISTICAL INFORMATION
The holdings of the Sugar Institute case with respect to statistical infor-
mation become most significant when examined in the light of the four
earlier cases which deal with this problem. These are the Hardwood Lum-
ber,31 the Linseed Oil,32 the Maple Flooring"3 and the Cement Association
cases.34 In each of these cases the Court examined as a whole the practices
of a particular trade association, especially those statistical activities which
affected prices. In the light of all the facts, it reached a conclusion as to the
total effect of these activities. In two instances it found the combination
unlawful and in two instances it found the combination lawful.
In the Hardwood Lumber case, the statistics collected by the associa-
tion disclosed the name of the member and the purchaser in each transaction.
The members agreed to inform the secretary of all changes in prices and
to be subject to audits and inspection. Their reports were not made public.
A questionnaire was sent periodically to all members asking for certain esti-
mates as to future activities. The records of the meetings of the associa-
tion and literature sent to members disclosed an attempt to persuade mem-
bers to limit production and thus raise prices. Prices had, as a matter of
fact, actually risen. The Court inferred an unlawful purpose and con-
demned the organization.
In the Linseed Oil case, the reports of subscribers were extremely de-
tailed, and there was an agreement among them to telegraph any quotations
made by them which varied from the established price list. A zoning system
was in use on the basis of which a delivered price policy had been established.
Again, each subscriber submitted to investigations. There were penalties
29. 56 Sup. Ct. at 639.
30. Id. at 640.
31. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (192).
32. United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 37i (I923).
33. Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 563 (1925).
34. Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (925).
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and forfeitures for breaches of the subscription agreement. All reports were
treated as confidential. In this case, also, prices had risen after the estab-
lishment of the organization. The Court found, upon an examination of
the whole situation, that the purpose and policy of the organization were
to suppress competition.
The Maple Flooring and Cement Association cases, which came later,
are sometimes regarded as having limited the effect of the Hardwood Lum-
ber and Linseed Oil cases. It seems more helpful to treat the later cases
as having been distinguished on their facts. These facts were quite different
in many respects, and if the decision of the Court is regarded as turning
upon the legality of the scheme as a whole rather than upon the legality of
particular practices there need be no conflict in the holdings.
The Maple Flooring case revealed a situation in which the prices of
members of the association were lower than those of non-members. The
reports which were made dealt only with past and closed transactions, rather
than future deals. The names of members and purchasers were not given
in these reports, but the general statistics gathered were given wide public-
ity. In addition, no agreement among the members was alleged either affect-
ing production, fixing prices or for price maintenance. In the Cement
Association case, it appeared that the exchange of detailed information was
definitely for the purpose of preventing fraud by the buyers. Reports were
sent to members without comment. Prices were not excessive, and while
they had risen during the period under consideration, they had not risen as
much as the prices of many other commodities.
The most illuminating comparison is between the instant case and the
Maple Flooring case. As to the latter, it should be further noted that the
Court held that the dissemination of information is normally an aid to
commerce and that the natural effect of the acquisition of wider and more
scientific knowledge of business conditions cannot be said to be an unreason-
able restraint of trade. In that case it was held that trade associations might
openly and fairly gather and disseminate information as to the cost of their
product, the volume of production and the actual price which the product
had brought in closed transactions, and that these activities might be con-
ducted pursuant to agreement.
In the Sugar Institute case the Supreme Court authorizes the use of a
statistical service which is much more comprehensive and detailed than that
considered in the Maple Flooring opinion. The decree not only permits
members of the Institute to give immediate publicity as to prices and terms of
sale in all closed transactions, but it also expressly authorizes the association
to make advance announcements as to future prices and terms of sale. The
',Court authorized the distribution of such information, since "it does not
appear that arrangements merely to circulate or relay such announcements
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threaten competitive opportunities." 35 The Court pointed out that the vice
in the Sugar Institute agreement did not lie in the announcement of past,
current and future prices, for "the unreasonable restraint . . . lay not in
advance announcements, but in the steps taken to secure adherence without
deviation from prices and terms thus announced." 36
It is now clear that a trade association may distribute current price
information where such distribution is for the purpose of advising competi-
tors and others of market conditions and not for the purpose of concertedly
fixing or raising prices or curtailing production.
The opinion in the Sugar Institute case indicates inferentially that an
association may collect and disseminate price information relating to par-
ticular sales. In holding that the agreement of the Sugar Institute went
further than was necessary to correct the evils at which it was said to be
aimed, the Court pointed out significantly that "if immediate publicity had
been given to prices and terms in all 'closed transactions' competitive pressure
would have been so great that the refiners would either have had to abandon
the discriminatory practices or extend them to all." 37 This statement is
meaningless unless it refers to the disclosure of the details of particular past
sales. Obviously neither a buyer nor a seller can determine whether a
competitor has given a discriminatory price unless he knows the amount of
the product which such competitor has sold, the location of the buyer, the
quality of the goods purchased, and other essential facts. If, as the Court
suggests, competitive pressure would eliminate unfair discrimination, the
Court must necessarily have had in mind the distribution of statistical infor-
mation with sufficient particularity to identify the locality of the buyer, the
date and the amount of the purchase, and other factors which may justify
a seller in giving one purchaser a lower price than another. The implied
authorization of the publication of such detailed facts is a material clarifi-
cation of the law governing the conduct of trade associations. If this
analysis of the opinion is correct, industry may employ the effective weapon
of publicity in dealing with unfair rebates and discriminations.
AGREEMENTS TO ELIMINATE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES OR OTHER EVILS
The opinion in the Sugar Institute case has been criticized as making it
impossible for industries voluntarily to correct unfair trade practices and
other evils which they face. This would appear to be not the true meaning
of the opinion. Rather, the opinion sustains the view that an agreement
to eliminate a practice that is unfair within the meaning of established law
or that tends to destroy an industry would not be questioned if limited to
the accomplishment of that one purpose. The opinion specifically affirms
35. 56 Sup. Ct. at 643.
36. Ibid.
37. Id. at 641.
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the doctrine laid down in the Appalachian Coals case,38 where the Court
upheld an agreement among competitors, who produced approximately 75
per cent of all coal produced in the "Southern Appalachian Coal Field,"
to market their product exclusively through a common sales agency. It
appeared there, however, that the agency would not be in a position to
dominate or control any market in which coal was sold. It was admitted
that the agreement tended to stabilize prices, but this effect upon the price
structure was justified because the agreement was intended to correct, and
did not in fact go beyond an attempt to correct, deplorable competitive condi-
tions existing in the sale of coal. In referring to the Appalachian Coals
case, the Court again lays down the principles which define similar lawful
agreements:
"Nor does the fact that the correction of abuses may tend to stabilize
a business, or to produce fairer price levels, require that abuses should
go uncorrected or that an effort to correct them should for that reason
alone be stamped as an unreasonable restraint of trade. Accordingly
we have held that a cooperative enterprise otherwise free from objec-
tion, which carries with it no monopolistic menace, is not to be con-
demned as an undue restraint merely because it may effect a change
in market conditions where the change would be in mitigation of recog-
nized evils and would not impair, but rather foster, fair competitive
opportunities . ... ,
Unlike the Appalachian Coals case, it was conceded by the Institute
that the evils which faced the sugar industry could have been corrected
without obligating the members to adhere without deviation to the future
prices and terms of sale which they had filed. It would seem, then, that
the agreement in the Sugar Institute case went further than was necessary
in order to correct the evils at which it was aimed. The combination in the
Sugar Institute case was condemned not because it eliminated competitive
evils and unfair practices, but because it unnecessarily imposed arbitrary
and onerous conditions upon sellers and buyers and others; and further-
more, to paraphrase the language of the Court, because the activities of the
Institute, although ostensibly for the purpose of preventing unfair competi-
tion, had in actuality the effect of impairing fair competition.
EFFECT OF THE DE CISI N
The practical effect of the decision may be summarized as follows:
(i) Competitors in an industry may not by agreement impose condi-
tions which substantially and adversely affect the normal freedom of buyer
and seller jointly to determine prices or other conditions of sale in specific
38. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 (933).
39. 56 Sup. Ct. at 642.
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transactions. 40  The condemnation of an agreement to eliminate quantity
discounts illustrates this doctrine.
(2) Competitors may, however, agree to eliminate unfair trade prac-
tices; that is, those practices which have been held to be illegal under prior
decisions. And even in such cases the agreement will be sustained only if it
is confined in its operation and effect to the elimination of the illegal prac-
tices. An agreement by competitors to abandon false and misleading adver-
tising is typical of the class of agreements which a court will uphold.41  Such
an agreement is effective because it crystallizes the application of the law to
the specific problems of the group.
(3) Where depressed economic conditions or unsound business prac-
tices threaten its life, industry need not sit idle, but may attempt to alleviate
those conditions by agreement.42  This in reality is a doctrine of economic
self-defense. Whether or not such an agreement unreasonably restrains
trade will, of course, depend upon the particular facts surrounding each
agreement. It is certain, however, that an agreement to correct industrial
evils will not be condemned by the Court merely because it tends to, affect
production or to stabilize prices. But, of course, industry under the guise of
correcting evils may not restrain trade.
(4) A properly devised and operated open price plan is not illegal.
This is one of the most significant points in the Sugar Institute case.
Members of an association may properly exchange information concern-
ing prices, whether past, present, or future-so long as no one of the mem-
bers is prevented, by agreement or otherwise, from changing his price at any
time. More particularly, the Sugar Institute case says that each member of
an industry must be free at any time to deviate from any of the prices, terms,
and conditions of sale which he has openly announced.
While competitors may openly file their prices, it of course goes without
saying that there may be no concerted activity in setting the price which is
to be filed.
43
Furthermore, it is not only the selling price which may be openly an-
nounced, for this is meaningless unless we know all of the surrounding
conditions of this price. And so competitors may file prices, discounts,
40. See cases cited in note 25, supra, and Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United
States, 282 U. S. 30 (193o) ; United States v. First Nat. Pictures, Inc., 282 U. S. 44 (1930).
41. It is axiomatic that it is not illegal to agree not to violate the law.
42. In United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. lo6, 177 (911), in rejecting
the contention of the government that the Sherman Act condemned all contracts and com-
binations directly restraining commerce, whether the restraint imposed was reasonable or not,
the Supreme Court said: "Thus the Government, for the purpose of fixing the illegal char-
acter of the original combination which organized the old American Tobacco Company,
asserts that the illegal character of the combination is plainly shown because the combination
was brought about to stay the progress of a flagrant and ruinous trade war. In other words,
tli contention is that as the act forbids every contract, and combination, it hence prohibits a
reasonable and just agreement made for the purpose of ending a trade war..
43. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927).
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allowances, and all other terms and conditions of sale. In fact, these items
would seem to be a necessary part of any open price plan because price has
meaning only as we are able to answer the questions, "Price of what?" and
"Price under what conditions ?"
If information is exchanged for the purpose of checking fraud, then it
would seem that members of a trade association may report all of their con-
tracts and permit the association to circulate detailed information about these
contracts. Mere summaries of production and sales would have a limited
value. If fraud and discrimination are to be discovered and checked, it may
be necessary-and it appears to be permissible-for the members of groups
to reveal publicly all of the essential details concerning any closed transac-
tion. This procedure would provide the most practical guarantee that all
buyers who are similarly situated will be treated equally.
(5) There is another specific activity of trade associations the status
of which is clarified by the Sugar Institute case. The Supreme Court has
often denied that there should be a penalty upon intelligence; in fact, the
Court has urged that accurate knowledge of competitive conditions is often
necessary if competition is to be free and fair. But it is now clear that
members of a trade association are free to compile and disseminate informa-
tion about competitive conditions only so long as they make it reasonably
available to others who have a right to the same information. However, the
Court recognizes that there may be certain information of interest only to
the members of a group which they may compile in a confidential manner
without obligation of wide publication. The facts in each individual case
will determine whether the information may be held confidential or whether
it must be made public.
The decision in the Sugar Institute case serves to reveal and make clear
the distinction that must exist between concerted action which confines itself
to the correction of economic abuses and unfair competition, and concerted
action which reaches further to restrain the normal processes of effective
competition.
